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MRS. SUMNER SPAULDING, Respondent, v. ARTHUR
A. CAMERON, Appellant.
[1] Waters-Surface and Flood Waters-Protection AgainstEvidence.-A finding that inundations of plaintiff's property
with mud were caused by defendant's negligence in constructing a fill is sustained by evidence that he failed to use the
proper procedure for making stable fills although warned of
the hazard he was thereby creating.
[2] Id.-Nuisances.-A negligently constructed fill causing plaintiff's property to be inundated with mud and threatening
repetitions thereof which, unless corrected, would compel her
to abandon her residence thereon, constitutes a nuisance within
Civ. Code, § 3479.
[3] Nuisances-Remedies-Review.-In an action to abate a nuisance and for damages, in which the court makes an express
finding of permanent damage to plaintiff's property based on
the continuing threat of future injury, but also makes an
inconsistent implied finding that the threat can be removed,
and where it cannot be said as a matter of law whether or
not it can, the appellate court will affirm that part of a
judgment awarding damages for actual physical injury, but
will reverse that part granting injunctive relief and awarding additional damages for loss in market value by reason
of the continuing threat, and will direct the trial court to
determine whether the nuisance is permanent.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Otto J. Emme, Judge. Affirmed in part
and reversed in part with instructions.
Action for damages and for injunctive relief. Judgment
for plaintiff affirmed in part and reversed in part.
Martin H. Easton, James A. Gardner, Overton, Lyman,
Prince & Vermille and Donald H. Ford for Appellant.
Samuel A. Rosenthal, Prinzmetal & Grant and Leonard
G. Ratner for Respondent.
[2] See Cal.Jur., Waters, § 275; Am.Jur., Waters, § 432.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Waters, § 411; [2] Waters, § 275;
[3] Nuisances, § 64.
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THAYNOR, J.-Plaintiff owns and occupies a house on
the east side of San Ysidro Drive, Los Angeles, at the bottom of Pea Vine Canyon. Defendant owns approximately 30
acres of land on the west slope of the canyon. In the summer and fall of 1946 defendant undertook leveling operations on his property. These operations consisted of removing the tops of three knolls and casting the earth over the
sides of adjoining canyons, forming fills. Approximately
one fifth of the earth was pushed over the west side of the
Pea Vine Canyon northwest of plaintiff's house. In November of 1946 as a result of heavy rains large quantities of
mud washed out of defendant's fill, flowed down the canyon,
surrounded plaintiff's house and inundated the garages located on the ground level. Plaintiff brought this action for
damages and for injunctive relief. The trial court found
that plaintiff's property had suffered physical damage in
the amount of $2,732.29, and that its market value had been
reduced in the amount of $24,000 because of the continuing
threat of future inundations of mud. It entered judgment
for damages for both items and also ordered defendant either
to remove the fill or to ''place protective structures around
. . . [it] in such manner that the property of the plaintiff
will not be endangered or threatened by the existence of
such deposits of loose dirt.'' Defendant appeals.
It is unnecessary to decide whether in the absence of neglig·ence defendant would be liable for creating on his property an earth fill that presented a continuing threat of injury to the property below. [1] There is evidence that
in making the fill defendant did not prepare the natural
hillside to hold the dirt he deposited thereon, nor did he
make use of available means to compact the earth as it was
laid down to prevent it from washing away. Experts testified that proper procedures for making stable fills were not
employed. Moreover, defendant was warned during the
course of the leveling operations of the hazard being created to the property below. Accordingly, the evidence is
stifficient to support the finding that the inundation of plaintiff's property was caused by defendant's negligence in constructing the fill. There is also sufficient evidence to support the finding that the fill constitutes a threat of repetitions of such inundations and will, unless corrected, compel
plaintiff to abandon her residence.
[2] On the basis of the foregoing findings it is clear that
defendant's fill constitutes a nuisance. ( Civ. Code, § 3479;
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Katenkamp v. Union Realty Co., 6 Cal.2d 765, 774, 776 [59
P.2d 473] ; Mcivor v. Mercer-Fraser Co., 76 Cal.App.2d 247,
254 [172 P.2d 758].) Defendant contends, however, that
the trial court erred in allowing damages for the decline in
market value of plaintiff's property in addition to damages
for the physical injury, particularly in view of the fact that
it ordered the abatement of the nuisance, the continuation
of which is the cause of the decrease in the market value.
Plaintiff, on the other hand, contends that there is in reality
no way in which defendant can abate the nuisance and that
it was therefore proper for the trial court to award damages
caused by the continuing threat of future injury.
In early decisions of this court it was held that it should
not be presumed that a nuisance would continue, and damages
were not allowed for a decrease in market value caused by
the existence of the nuisance but were limited to the actual
physical injury suffered before the commencement of the
action. (Hopkins v. Western Pac. R. Co., 50 Cal. 190, 194;
Severy v. Central Pac. R. Co., 51 Cal. 194, 197; see, also,
Coats v. Atchison T. & S. F. R. Co., 1 Cal.App. 441, 444-445
[82 P. 640] .) The remedy for a continuing nuisance was
either a suit for injunctive relief or successive actions for
damages as new injuries occurred. Situations arose, however, where injunctive relief was not appropriate or where
Ruccessive actions were undesirable either to the plaintiff
or the defendant or both. Accordingly, it was recognized
that some types of nuisances should be considered permanent, and in such cases recovery of past and anticipated
future damages were allowed in one action. (Eachus v. Los
Angeles Consol. Elec. Ry. Co., 103 Cal. 614, 622 [37 P. 750,
42 Am.St.J~ep. 149] ; Williams v. Southern Pac. Co., 150 Cal.
624, 626-628 [89 P. 599]; Rankin v. DeBare, 205 Cal. 639,
641 /271 P. 1050] ; see McCormick on Damages, § 127, pp.
504-505.)
'l'he clearest case of a permanent nuisance or trespass is
the oue where the offending structure or condition is maintained as a necessary part of the operations of a public
utility. Since such conditions are ordinarily of indefinite duration and since the utility by making compensation
is entitled to continue them, it is appropriate that only
one action should be allowed to recover for all the damages
inflicted. It would be unfair to the utility to subject it to
successive suits and unfair to the injured party if he were
not allowed to recover all of his probable damages at once.
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(See McCormick, Damages for Anticipated Injury to Land,
37 Harv.L.Rev. 574, 584-585.)
A more difficult problem is presented, however, if the defendant is not privileged to continue the nuisance or trespass
but its abatement is impractical or the plaintiff is willing
that it continue if he can secure full compensation for both
past and anticipated future injuries. To attempt categorically to classify such a nuisance as either permanent or not
may lead to serious injustice to one or the other of the parties. Thus, if the plaintiff assumes it is not permanent and
sues only for past damages, he may be met with the plea
of res judicata in a later action for additional injury if the
court then decides the nuisance was permanent in character
from its inception. (See Slater v. Shell Oil Co., 58 Cal.App.2d
864, 870 [137 P.2d 713] .) Similarly, if the initial injury
is slight and plaintiff delays suit until he has suffered substantial damage and the court then determines that the nuisance was permanent, the defendant may be able to raise
the defense that the statute of limitations ran from the time
of the initial injury. (See Phillips v. City of Pasadena, 27
Cal.2d 104, 107-108 [162 P.2d 625].) On the other hand,
if the defendant is willing and able to abate the nuisance,
it is unfair to award damages on the theory that it will
contimi£. (See Meek v. De Latour, 2 Cal.App. 261, 265 [83
P. 300] ; cf., Collier v. Merced Irr. Dist., 213 Cal. 554, 566
[2 P.2d 790] ; Colorado P. Co. v. Pacific G. & E. Co., 218 Cal.
559,567 [24 P.2d 495].)
Because of these difficulties it has been recognized that
in doubtful cases the plaintiff should have an election to
treat the nuisance as either permanent or not. (Kafka v.
Bozio, 191 Cal. 746, 752 [218 P. 753, 29 A.L.R. 833] ; see
Restatement, Torts, § 930; McCormick on Damages, § 127,
p. 511 et seq.; 4 Sutherland on Damages [4th ed.] § 1046,
p. 3874.) If the defendant is not privileged to continue
the nuisance and is able to abate it, he cannot complain
if the plaintiff elects to bring successive actions as damages accrue until abatement takes place. (Phillips v. City
of Pasadena, 27 Cal.2d 104, 107-108 [162 P.2d 625]; Strong
v. Sullivan, 180 Cal. 331, 334-335 [181 P. 59, 4 A.L.R.
343] .) On the other hand, if it appears improbable as a
practical matter that the nuisance can or will be abated,
the plaintiff should not be left to the troublesome remedy
of successive actions. (See Restatement, Torts, § 930, com-

Jan. 1952]

SPAULDING

v.

CAMERON

269

[38 C.2d 265; 239 P.2d 625]

ment c; McCormick, Damages for Anticipated Injury to
Land, 37 Harv.L.Rev. 574, 594-595.)
The facts of the present case aptly illustrate the problem
involved. As a result of the nuisance created by defendant,
plaintiff's property suffered physical injury. There is also
evidence that while the nuisance continues its rental value
is impaired, and that if the nuisance is not abated its market
value will continue to be substantially depressed. There is
evidence that would support the conclusion that there is
little or nothing defendant can do to abate the nuisance. On
the assumption that this conclusion is correct, plaintiff contends that she is entitled to recover the full diminution in
the market value caused by the probable continuation of the
nuisance. On the other hand, defendant contends that he
can and will abate the nuisance. There is evidence that
would support the conclusion that corrective measures taken
by defendant will prevent further flows of mud. Moreover,
since defendant intends to make use of the top surface of
the fill it is not improbable that he will do whatever is practically possible to stabilize it. On the assumption that he
has or will be able to abate the nuisance defendant contends
that plaintiff's damages should be limited to those suffered
in the past and should not include speculative future losses
based on the assumption that the nuisance will continue.
[3] The findings and conclusions of the trial court on
these conflicting contentions are inconsistent. The court
found that plaintiff's property had been permanently damaged because of the continuing threat of future injury. It
also found, however, that this threat would continue unless
corrective measures were taken, and by ordering that such
measures be taken impliedly found that they were feasible.
It is clear that plaintiff cannot have both remedies. If defendant obeys the injunction and takes such measures that
''the property of the plaintiff will not be endangered or
threatened by the existence of such deposits of loose dirt,''
there will no longer be a threat to depreciate the value of
the property. Plaintiff would obtain a double recovery if
she could recover for the depreciation in value and also
have the cause of that depreciation removed.
A similar problem was presented in Meek v. De Latour, 2
Cal.App. 261 [83 P. 300]. In that case plaintiff secured
a judgment ordering the abatement of a cream of tartar
factory and awarding damages. In compliance with the
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judgment the factory was removed and on appeal it was
held that evidence of the decrease in market value caused
by its presence was inadmissible. "It seems perfectly clear
that such testimony . . ., where the abatement of a nuisance
is sought, is inadmissible on the question of damages. Otherwise a plaintiff could recover for the depreciation in value
of his property and at the same time remove the depreciation by abating the cause of it." (2 Cal.App. at 265.)
In the present case it cannot be said as a matter of law
that the nuisance can or cannot be abated. In view of
the inconsistent findings and the conflict in the evidence,
it would be inappropriate for this court to determine whether
the nuisance is in fact permanent and to modify the judg·ment by striking the damages for loss of market value on
the assumption it is not permanent, or by striking the injunctive provisions on the assumption that it is. (Tuprnan
v. Habe1·kern, 208 Cal. 256, 269-270 [280 P. 970].)
Since plaintiff has proved defendant's liability for the
actual physical injury to the property the judgment should
be affirmed to the extent that it awards $2,732.29 clamages for that injury. To the extent that the judgment
awards additional damages and also grants injunctive relief it must be reversed. On retrial the trial court should
determine whether or not the nuisance is in fact permanent.
If it finds that it is, it should enter judgment for the deerease in market value. If it finds that it is not, it should
grant injunctive relief and such additional damages as may
be proved for the temporary decrease in the value of the
use of the property while the nuisance continued. (See
Bourdieu v. Seaboard Oil Cor·p., 48 Cal.App.2d 429, 437438 [119 P.2d 973]; Guttinger v. Calaveras Cernent Co., 105
Cal.App.2d 382, 387 [233 P.2d 914]; McCormick on Damages,
§ 127, pp. 503-504.)
'fo the extent that it awards damages of $2,732.29 the
judgment is affirmed. In all other respects the judgment
is reversed and the eause is remanded to the trial court with
instructions to determine on the basis of the evidence previously presented and sueh additional evidence as may be presented by the parties ~whether or not the nnisanee is in faet
prrmanent. Eaeh party is to bear his own costs on this appeal.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Sehauer, J., and
Spence, J., concurred.
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CA:R'l'ER, J.-1 dissent.
l am of the opinion that the portion of the judgment for
damages should be affirmed and the injunctive feature either
amended or affirmed as correctly construed.
In this case the defendant negligently maintained loose
dirt on his land which has in the past, when it rained, moved
onto plaintiff's land. The court expressly found that such
condition existing on defendant's land permanently depreciated the market value of plaintiff's land as follows: " . . .
by reason of the acts of the defendant . . . plaintiff's property has suffered a substantial and permanent 'impairment of
value and has lost its desirability as a residence for plaintiff, or any prospective purchasers; that it is true that the
fair market value of the house on plaintiff's property before the deposit of the loose dirt, and the damage occasioned
thereby, was the sum of $40,000.00, and that the fair resale value of said house after the damage caused by the
defc"ndant . . . was the sum of $16,000.00, to plaintiff's detriment and damage in the sum of $24,000.00, and it is true
that the maintenance by the defendant . . . of the loose
quantities of dirt on his premises will cause plaintiff great
and in·epamble injury and will permanently deprive plaintiff's land of any value for residential purposes." (Italics
added.) It is conceded by the majority that that finding is
supportecl by the evidence. The majority opinion says, however, that there is an inconsistent finding to the effect that
the condition on defendant's land is not permanent--can
be abated. 'l'here is no e.xpress finding to that effect. Assuming there is an implied finding flowing from the fact
that an injunction was given, then the duty of this court
is to liberally construe the findings to support the part of
the judgment based upon such findings, rather than reversing the entire judgment. Thus the implied inconsistent
fillCling tl1at the condition can be abated may be ignored,
and the part of tlw judgment awarding injunctive relirf
rcwrsed, while affirming the damage portion which is basrd
on an express finding of permanent damage. In line with
the settled rule that findings must be liberally construed to
support the judgment and specific findings control over general ones (24 Cal.Jur. 1007 et seq.) an express finding prevails over an implied one. (See Central H. Imp. Co. v. Memorial Pa,rks, Inc., 40 CalApp.2d 591 [105 P.2d 596].)
It is not neeessary, however, to reverse the injunctive provision in the judgment, for correctly construed, under the
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rule requiring liberal construction to support it, there is
no inconsistency. So interpreted, it enjoins only the maintenance in the future by defendant on his land of additional
loose soil, that is, in addition to what is already there. The
findings are readily susceptible of that construction. It is
found that ''Plaintiff is entitled to a permanent restraining
order against the defendant, enjoining . . . defendant . . .
from excavating, re-surfacing or distributing his said land
and depositing loose dirt in any manner which may threaten
or endanger the residence of the plaintiff, and ordering the
defendant .
to remove deposits of loose dirt upon his
said land, or in lieu thereof, to place protecting structures
around said loose dirt in such a manner that the property
of the plaintiff will not be endangered or threatened by the
existence of deposits of loose dirt." (Italics added.) It
will be noted that the participle form of the verbs "excavate,
re-surface or distribute" speak in the future. It could not
be speaking of the past because that soil had already been
excavated and distributed. The removal of the dirt being
in the same tenor, refers to the dirt to be distributed in the
future, after the entry of the judgment. It is true that
the judgment also refers to the removal of dirt theretofore
deposited. That portion of the judgment is out of harmony
with the findings and should be modified.
I would therefore modify the judgment with respect to
injunctive relief against dirt already deposited on defendant's land and affirm the judgment as so modified.
>

•

>

The opinion and judgment were modified to read as above
printed and respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied
:F'ebruary 14, 1952. Carter, ,T., was of the opinion that the
petition should be granted.

